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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Complexity in the law inspires much confusion. In some respects, 
however, we are quite sure of ourselves. We think, for example, that 
we can easily recognize legal complexity when we see it. We are also 
sure that the law is often too complex.1 We do allow for the possible 
advantages of complexity in certain cases.2 Generally, though, we as-
sume that what is simple is both readily recognized and desirable. 
                                                                                                                      
 * Professor, Cumberland School of Law, Samford University; Visiting Professor, 
Michigan State University College of Law, 2000-2001. 
 1. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995); see also 
PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY ix (1988); WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION 138 
(1991) (When the law takes the form of clear, comprehensive, objective, and preannounced 
rules, litigation is mostly a waste of time.); Craig J. Albert, The Deceptive Allure of Sim-
plicity, 26 SETON HALL L. REV. 1414, 1414 (1996) ([T]he drive for simplicity has been the 
motivating force behind the major movements in legal scholarship of this century, begin-
ning with Legal Realism.); Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 12-13 (1974); Edward J. McCaffery, The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 
1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1990); Kevin C. McMunigal, Desert, Utility, and Minimum 
Contacts: Toward a Mixed Theory of Personal Jurisdiction, 108 YALE L.J. 189, 195 (1998) 
(arguing that the complexity of the minimum contacts test has hampered rather than im-
proved the test); Ellen Wertheimer, Calabresis Razor: A Short Cut to Responsibility, 28 
STETSON L. REV. 105, 105 (1998) (noting that Ockhams Razor of simplification is even 
more applicable in the legal realm than in the scientific); Ellen Wertheimer, Pursuing 
Health in an Era of Change: Emerging Legal Issues in Managed Care, 43 VILL. L. REV. 
321, 321 (1998). 
 2. See Albert, supra note 1; see also Cynthia R. Farina, The Consent of the Governed: 
Against Simple Rules For a Complex World, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 987 (1997); Eric W. 
Orts, Simple Rules and the Perils of Reductionist Legal Thought, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1441 
(1995) (book review); Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and 
Cures, 42 DUKE L.J. 1, 8 (1992). 
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Culturally, we have long linked the simple with the true and the 
good.3 
 But all this is overly simple. Complexity in the law is much more 
complex than we imagine. There are, it turns out, any number of 
more or less separate and independent kinds of complexity in the 
law. We can reduce legal complexity in one respect without also re-
ducing the laws complexity in other respects, and usually only at the 
cost of greater complexity in other respects. Which forms of complex-
ity in the law are most important will require highly contestable 
value judgments. These value judgments are often deeply political. 
Even when we do seem to reduce legal complexity in accordance with 
our own debatable value preferences, we often only succeed in shift-
ing inescapable complexities forward or backward in time, or to a dif-
ferent stage of the law making and law enforcement process. Ulti-
mately, to say in any given case that we have simplified the law is at 
best to oversimplify what we have done, and at worst to mislead our 
audience. 
 The discussion below begins by inventorying some of the forms of 
complexity in the law and then introducing some of the complications 
of legal complexity. After a brief nod in the direction of complex liti-
gation4 and complexity theory in mathematics and science,5 we con-
trast Lon Fullers discussion of polycentricity with Richard Epsteins 
emphasis on the costs of complying with some legal provision.6 We 
then focus on legal complexity as a matter of sheer number. In par-
ticular, we consider complexity as a matter of the sheer number of 
elements or components of a legal code or system, the number of as-
sumptions underlying a legal rule, the number of proscriptions im-
posed upon legal actors, and the number of distinctions or exceptions 
                                                                                                                      
 3. Ockhams Razor suggests that we not multiply entities or hypotheses unnecessar-
ily. See, e.g., Lewis Feuer, The Principle of Simplicity, 24 PHIL. SCI. 109, 109 (1957); Elliott 
Sober, The Principle of Parsimony, 32 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 145, 145 (1981). More positively, 
it has been argued that [t]he most persuasive lines of reasoning . . . are usually fairly sim-
ple trains of thought. THOMAS V. MORRIS, MAKING SENSE OF IT ALL 66 (1997). Histori-
cally, simplicity was often thought of as a divine attribute. See, e.g., ARISTOTLE, 
METAPHYSICS 1088B28, 304 (Richard Hope trans., 1960); ST. AUGUSTINE, THE CITY OF GOD 
153 (Gerald G. Walsh et al. trans., 1958); BRIAN DAVIES, THE THOUGHT OF THOMAS 
AQUINAS 44-45 (1993); MOSES MAIMONIDES, THE GUIDE OF THE PERPLEXED OF 
MAIMONIDES 89 (M. Friedlander trans., 1956); Katherin Rogers, The Traditional Doctrine 
of Divine Simplicity, 32 RELIG. STUD. 165, 165 (1996). Whether simplicity is actually a use-
ful guide to the truth, however, has been doubted. See, e.g., Steven O. Kimbrough, On 
Simplicity as a Guide to Truth, 9 KINESIS 55, 70 (1979); Keith Lehrer, Against Simplicity 
in Philosophical Analysis 119, 122 (David F. Austin ed., 1988); ROBERT NOZICK, Simplicity 
as Fall-Out, in HOW MANY QUESTIONS? 105, 105 (Leigh S. Cauman et al. eds., 1983) (It is 
difficult to think of any reasonable explanation for why . . . a simplicity maxim should help 
. . . arrive at the truth.). 
 4. See infra text accompanying notes 22-25. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 26-31. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
2000]                          ILLUSION OF SIMPLICITY 717 
 
embodied in a legal rule or code.7 This sort of numerical complexity 
can occur at any level of a legal system, from individual judicial cases 
to statutes to codes to the legal system as a whole. Even these sorts 
of purely numerical determinations by themselves are not particu-
larly easy. How many assumptions, for example, underlie our current 
tax code, the Constitution, the free speech clause, or, for that matter, 
the French Constitution? Will these numbers ever be objective and 
uncontroversial? 
 A further complication is that undeniably, legal complexity is not 
simply a matter of sheer number. All else equal, the greater the vari-
ety or differences among its parts, the more complex something is.8 
The number of elements of a legal system, for example, does not tell 
us much about the diversity of those elements. But even this compli-
cation is too static. The complexity of any portion of a legal system, or 
of the legal system itself, is also partly a matter of its functional or 
operational complexity.9 There is a difference between the variety of 
a systems elements and the complexity of their mutual interaction. 
We can hardly understand legal complexity without considering, in 
particular, the legal systems supposedly layered, hierarchical com-
plexity,10 and more broadly the legal systems interrelational and or-
ganizational complexity.11 
 Cutting across these forms of legal complexity are, inescapably, 
the intimidatingly named dimensions of ontological, epistemic, and 
pragmatic complexity.12 We shall define and address these forms of 
complexity in turn. Related to epistemic and pragmatic complexity 
are the more familiar ideas of formal, notational, and stylistic com-
plexity.13 Stylistic complexity, in turn, is subdivided into semantic 
and syntactic complexity.14 Legal complexity, it turns out, is almost 
endlessly subdividable, and itself almost indefinitely complex. 
 These dimensions of legal complexity are not exhaustive, but they 
will suffice to illustrate the major problems. We will then discuss the 
crucial factor of the typical absence, at best, of any positive correla-
tion among the various forms of legal complexity.15 Judgments as to 
what is legally complex and what is legally simple are therefore in-
deed mere judgments, somehow reflecting the strength and weakness 
of the various interests at stake and potentially quite contestable.16 
                                                                                                                      
 7. See infra text accompanying notes 45-49. 
 8. See infra text accompanying note 50. 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 55-58. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 59-62. 
 11. See infra text accompanying notes 63-70. 
 12. See infra text accompanying notes 76-78, 88-90. 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 104-106. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 111-116. 
 15. See infra Part II. 
 16. See infra Part II. 
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These sorts of typically political judgments are thus deeply evalua-
tive17 and deeply complex themselves. To these complexities we add 
another: what appears to be really complex may seem simpler, and 
vice versa, if we translate or merely redescribe the particular law 
into other terms.18 
 As it turns out, legal complexity is more complex, and more un-
avoidable, than even this much suggests. Even if we could all agree 
that through some reform we are simplifying a particular law in 
some particular respect, often we would only be displacing the legal 
complexity we started with, by shifting that complexity backward or 
forward in the legal system, or onto some other stage of the broader 
political process.19 We may fairly conclude that for all these reasons, 
complexity in the law cannot simply be reduced in any reasonably 
uncontroversial way. Simplifying the law in general, or even some 
particular area of the law, takes on the profitlessness of the prover-
bial wild goose chase. 
II.   SOME DIMENSIONS OF COMPLEXITY: LEGAL  
COMPLEXITY AS ITSELF COMPLEX 
 There are a number of kinds of complexity to be found in the law. 
The number of different kinds of legal complexity reflects the variety 
of interests we may have at stake in the law. As our legal interests 
are not entirely permanently fixed,20 we should not expect to produce 
an exhaustive list of all of the dimensions of legal complexity. As our 
interests conflict and evolve, new forms of complexity in the law may 
arise, or, at the very least, old forms of legal complexity may take on 
greater or lesser importance. A complete and final assessment of all 
of the kinds of complexity in the law is therefore impossible. 
A.    Ambiguous Complexity 
 An initial complication is that the very idea of complexity in the 
law is itself already ambiguous. For example, an area of law desig-
nated complex litigation already exists.21 Complex litigation in this 
                                                                                                                      
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See infra Part II. 
 19. See infra Part III. 
 20. The stakes that various groups have in either promoting stability in the law or in 
destabilizing the law may change over time. See generally Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The 
Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 614 (1983) (discussing the problem 
of instituting destabilization rights). 
 21. See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS WITH REPORTERS STUDY: A MODEL SYSTEM FOR STATE-
TO-STATE TRANSFER AND CONSOLIDATION (1994); BOARD OF EDITORS OF THE FEDERAL 
JUDICIAL CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION 8-9 (1970); 
RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 
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technical sense has itself proved difficult to define precisely.22 It 
seems to involve, at a minimum, multiple party and multi-district 
litigation.23 These factors by themselves certainly do not nearly ex-
haust the various dimensions of legal complexity in the broader 
sense we are concerned with. There is, however, some degree of over-
lap between the complexity of complex litigation and legal complexity 
in our broader sense. The multiplicity of parties and jurisdictions in 
litigation are certainly forms of complexity in our sense, and it seems 
reasonable to suppose that increasing the number of parties and ju-
risdictions involved in a lawsuit often tends to complicate the legal 
issues involved or to raise some costs for some parties.24 
 There is also complexity in the sense of complexity theory, as 
developed by mathematicians and scientists to describe some behav-
iors of dynamic systems.25 Complexity in this mathematical sense 
typically involves systems with an irreducibly large number of ele-
ments, evolving dynamically over time without reaching a stable 
long-term equilibrium.26 Crucially, such systems often feature short-
range or neighborhood interactions among their elements that re-
sult in dramatic discontinuities, tipping, avalanches, or emergent 
properties and disproportional effects,27 with the locally interacting 
elements commonly not aware of the overall effect on the system.28 
 Something akin to this mathematical sense of complexity may 
well be exhibited in legal systems.29 At the very least, we can think of 
                                                                                                                      
ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (1998); JAMES L. STENGEL & ANDREW M. CALAMARI, 
COMPLEX LITIGATION (1994). 
 22. See Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the 
Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1692 (1992) (Other than the rich 
diversity of the proposals, the most striking feature of the commentary on complex litiga-
tion is the lack of agreement about a definition for the subject.); see also Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1987) (stating that [c]omplex 
litigation means different things to different people); Jeffrey W. Stempel, A More Com-
plete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 781, 785 n.12 (1998) (quoting Burbank, supra.). 
 23. See Stempel, supra note 22, at 786. 
 24. Cf. Burbank, supra note 22, at 1481 (Litigation may be called complex because of 
the joinder of multiple parties, the difficulty of the issues involved, or the volume of discov-
ery and evidence necessitating substantial court administration. Sometimes, however, 
cases take on complexities by virtue of their relationship to other cases.). 
 25. See, e.g., Hope M. Babcock, Democracys Discontents in a Complex World: Can 
Avalanches, Sandpiles, and Finches Optimize Michael Sandels Civic Republican Commu-
nity?, 85 GEO. L.J. 2085, 2086 (1997) (Complexity theory, which includes chaos and catas-
trophe theory, is an overarching field of mathematical analysis of the behavior of nonlinear 
dynamic systems.). For popular treatments, see, for example, JOHN L. CASTI, 
COMPLEXIFICATION (1994); James P. Crutchfield et al., Chaos, in CHAOS AND COMPLEXITY 
35 (Robert John Russell et al. eds., 1995). 
 26. See, e.g., PAUL CILLIERS, COMPLEXITY AND POSTMODERNISM 3-4 (1998). 
 27. See id. 
 28. See id. 
 29. See J.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-and-
Society System: A Wake-Up Call for Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative 
State, 45 DUKE L.J. 849 (1996); see also Eric Kades, The Laws of Complexity and the Com-
plexity of Laws: The Implications of Computational Complexity Theory for the Law, 49 
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some important legal phenomena as analogous to the processes ex-
amined by mathematical complexity theory. Consider, for example, a 
large corporation sued in connection with the manufacture and sale 
of a widely used but allegedly defective product.30 The first few plain-
tiffs might, conceivably, recover compensatory and even punitive 
damages in independent, uncoordinated actions. It is also imagin-
able, however, that at some point the addition of a single otherwise 
indistinguishable plaintiff may tip the defendant into filing for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection, representing a dramatic disconti-
nuity in the legal relationships of all the parties. 
 We shall not, however, focus solely on circumstances that can be 
analogized to this mathematical sort of complexity. We will, never-
theless, continue to use the term complexity, understanding that 
complexity in our broad sense might be synonymous with something 
like complicatedness beyond complexity in any technical sense. 
 Complexity in our own homespun, garden-variety sense of com-
plicatedness can be found in the law at many different points. This 
is itself a complication, as there is no guarantee that complexity will 
mean the same thing, or even have similar effects, regardless of what 
kind of element of the law it is attached to. We can certainly think of 
litigation as being complex,31 but it is also possible to think of the 
pretrial,32 trial,33 and post-trial remedy or appeal34 stages of litigation 
as themselves complicated, though perhaps in different ways. More 
analytically, we can see complexity as an attribute, in one way or an-
other, of legal rules,35 legal processes,36 legal institutions,37 and of the 
supporting culture.38 
B.   Polycentricity vs. Cost of Compliance 
 Many aspects of the law thus can be described as complex. Admit-
tedly, this concept by itself cannot show that complexity in the law is 
                                                                                                                      
RUTGERS L. REV. 403 (1997) (focusing on computational complexity theory in particular); 
J.B. Ruhl & Harold J. Ruhl, Jr., The Arrow of the Law in Modern Administration, 30 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 405, 460 (1997).  
 30. See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d 89, 90 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(discussing Johns-Manville Corp. v. Asbestos Litigation Group (In re Johns-Manville 
Corp.), 26 B.R. 420 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1983), affd, 40 B.R. 219 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 31. See supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text. 
 32. See Tidmarsh, supra note 23, at 1701. 
 33. See id. at 1704. 
 34. See id. at 1707. 
 35. See Peter H. Schuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 
42 DUKE L.J. 1, 3 (1992). 
 36. See id. 
 37. See id. 
 38. See id. Substantively, Professor Schuck distinguishes among density, technical-
ity, differentiation, and indeterminacy or uncertainty as dimensions or features of legal 
complexity. See id. 
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a complicated idea. Complexity shows up in many different legal con-
texts, but more importantly, legal complexity also takes on many 
guises. Legal complexity means a number of different things, along a 
number of different dimensions. These diverse meanings of legal 
complexity clearly cannot be reduced to one, or even a few, more ba-
sic general meanings. Even more importantly for our purposes, these 
various meanings of legal complexity certainly do not all strongly 
positively correlate with one another, and may not positively corre-
late with each other at all. 
 Consider, merely for the sake of an initial example, two mutually 
irreducible forms of complexity in the law. First, think of Lon Fullers 
idea of polycentricity in the law. A polycentric dispute is, roughly, 
one in which any resolution is likely to have difficult-to-predict, indi-
rect consequences for the parties and for other groups perhaps not 
directly represented in the legal dispute.39 As Fuller expressed it, 
the more interacting centers there are, the more the likelihood that 
one of them will be affected by a change in circumstances, and, if the 
situation is polycentric, this change will communicate itself after a 
complex pattern to other centers.40 
 Fuller is thus clearly discussing a general form of complexity that 
may characterize the law, or at least some aspects of the law. This 
form of legal complexity cannot be reduced to or somehow translated 
into all of the other forms, however. Consider, for example, Richard 
Epsteins understanding of complexity in the law. Professor Epstein 
specifies that on his view, [a]ny rule that explicitly begins with [the 
words unless otherwise agreed] cannot . . . constitute a complex rule, 
for those who do not like what it provides will run and hide from its 
application.41 In applying Epsteins approach, then, variables like 
the unavoidable costs of complying with a rule will be crucial to as-
sessing the degree of complexity of the rule, along with whatever else 
legal complexity may involve.42 
 Neither Fullers nor Epsteins approach need be held out as the 
basis for a full and comprehensive understanding of complexity in 
the law. Our point is, first, that even with the greatest ingenuity, 
polycentricity cannot be reduced to anything like rule compliance 
                                                                                                                      
 39. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 30, at 476-78; Edward L. Rubin, Legal Reasoning, Le-
gal Process, and the Judiciary As an Institution, 85 CAL. L. REV. 265, 284-85 (1997) (re-
viewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT (1996)); Tidmarsh, 
supra note 23, at 1728.  
 40. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 397 
(1978). 
 41. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27.  
 42. See id. at 25-27; Joseph P. Tomain, Book Review: Simple Rules for a Complex 
World, 36 JURIMETRICS J. 409, 411 (1996); see also Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., supra note 29, at 470 
(citing compliance costs as one element of structural complexity in the law); McCaffery, 
supra note 1, at 1271-72 (distinguishing structural complexity in his sense of the term 
from compliance complexity). 
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costs. Similarly, rule compliance costs cannot be reduced to anything 
like polycentricity. More crucially for our purposes, polycentricity 
certainly does not seem even to be strongly associated or correlated 
with relatively high compliance costs. Either form of legal complexity 
might well be present without the other. 
 Suppose, for example, we have a statute that is quite simple in 
Epsteins sense. Consider a broad federal statute extensively regulat-
ing, pensions, labor relations, or the sale of securities but prefaced by 
Epsteins opt-out language allowing the most directly affected parties 
to agree simply not to be bound by the remaining statutory terms, 
and to substitute their own agreement. Or consider a no-fault divorce 
statute that admits of no opt-out, but which can otherwise be com-
plied with at low cost. Accordingly, these statutes are simple on Ep-
steins understanding. But does this mean that the statutes are also 
not complex in Fullers sense of polycentricity? Hardly. Even with 
their opt-out provisions and low compliance costs, these statutes may 
well have unpredictable and important indirect long-term conse-
quences for many persons other than those most directly involved. 
 That a statute permits the most directly affected persons to con-
tract around the remainder of the statute hardly means that other 
individuals are not indirectly affected. If a statute allowed employers 
and employees to contract around an elaborate pension system in ex-
change for higher current income, spouses, dependents, and other 
more remote third parties could be substantially and unpredictably 
affected. Conversely, suppose a statute is inescapable and otherwise 
has high compliance costs. From Epsteins standpoint, the statute is 
therefore complex. Does this mean, necessarily, that the statute and 
its implementation and enforcement are more polycentric than other 
sorts of statutes? Why could a statute not be costly to comply with 
but largely focused, in its effects, on the parties involved?43 
 Thus we should hardly expect legal complexity in Fullers sense 
and in Epsteins sense to be inseparable. Instead, we may well en-
counter either form of complexity in the absence of the other. When 
we consider the variety of other forms of legal complexity, we find, 
certainly, no broad pattern of any positive mutual correlation. Some 
forms of complexity may well tend to positively correlate with certain 
other forms. However, some forms of legal complexity will not tend to 
vary along with other sorts, or may even vary inversely. 
                                                                                                                      
 43. Arguably all statutes generate polycentricity issues. Surely, however, not all stat-
utes are equally polycentric in their effects. However overdrawn it may occasionally be, the 
distinction between legislation that is mainly paternalistic and legislation that is less pa-
ternalistic is not simply an illusion. See generally JOEL FEINBERG, HARM TO SELF (reprint 
ed. 1989); JOHN KLEINIG, PATERNALISM (1983); DONALD VANDEVEER, PATERNALISTIC 
INTERVENTION: THE MORAL BOUNDS OF BENEVOLENCE (1986). 
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C.   Variance and Numbers 
 Complexity in the law is often thought of, for example, in terms 
quite remote from either Fullers polycentricity or Epsteins compli-
ance costs. Perhaps most obviously, we often associate complexity, 
whether of a legal rule, an opinion, a judicial code, an entire legal 
system, or apart from the law, with something like the number of 
elements or components involved.44 The greater the number of parts 
the greater the complexity, all else equal.45 
 Once we recognize that the number of constituent elements of 
some broader object bears on its complexity, however, we are likely to 
conclude that this dimension, too, cannot be the sole measure of com-
plexity. If we were asked, for example, whether one mosaic tile pat-
tern was more complex than another, we might well care about the 
sheer number of tiles constituting each mosaic, but that would 
hardly exhaust the matter. If we think about the complexity of legal 
theories, statutes, codes, or even of legal systems, we might ask not 
only about the number of their elements, but also about the number 
of assumptions or postulates underlying the theory, provisions, or 
system at issue.46 
 Surely there is a difference between the number of component 
parts of a system and the number of assumptions or postulates we 
must entertain in order to explain or justify the operation of that sys-
tem. If the free speech clause has, let us simply assume, only one 
partand this itself is debatablewould we therefore assume that 
there can also only be one important assumption, value, or purpose 
underlying the free speech clause? If we detected four assumptions 
underlying the free speech clause, would we also expect to find four 
parts to that clause? 
 There can be variations on the legal complexity theme as a matter 
of sheer number. We might, for example, combine the concern for 
number with Professor Epsteins emphasis on compliance costs to see 
the laws complexity as a matter of the number of prohibitions em-
bodied in the law.47 Or we might choose to see complexity also as 
                                                                                                                      
 44. See, e.g., NICHOLAS RESCHER, COMPLEXITY: A PHILOSOPHICAL OVERVIEW 1, 9 
(1998); Janice Toran, Tis a Gift To Be Simple: Aesthetics and Procedural Reform, 89 MICH. 
L. REV. 352, 361 (1990). 
 45. Recognizing that complexity is partly a matter of the sheer number of elements or 
components involved hardly suggests that this is the only form of, or all that matters with 
respect to, complexity. See RESCHER, supra note 44, at 1, 9; Toran, supra note 44, at 361. 
 46. See, e.g., RICHARD SWINBURNE, THE EVOLUTION OF THE SOUL 12 (rev. ed. 1997); 
George Schlesinger, The Principle of Simplicity and Verifiability, 26 PHIL. SCI. 41, 41 
(1959). For commentary on Swinburnes approach, see Don Fawkes & Tom Smythe, Sim-
plicity and Theology, 32 REL. STUD. 259, 259 (1996). 
 47. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27 (If under one legal system a factory . . . 
may be built without any prior government approval, then that system is simpler than one 
which requires approval by a local zoning board . . .); Ruhl & Ruhl, Jr., supra note 29, at 
470. 
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partly a matter of the number of distinctions drawn by, or exceptions 
built into, a law.48 It seems evident that the number of exceptions 
and distinctions built into a set of legal rules need not be a function 
of the sheer number of rules. Consider a variant of the game of 
checkers with an enormous number of pieces, but in which no func-
tional or operational distinctions are drawn among the pieces. Each 
player has, let us say, hundreds of identical pieces, moving in one 
single invariant fashion. Surely, we would not see this game as ex-
treme in its complexity. 
 Complexity, though, cannot be confined to matters of sheer num-
ber. If we think again of the mosaics complexity, we will want to 
consider not just the number of tiles, but something like the variety 
of tiles as well. Similarly, the complexity of a legal code or legal sys-
tem will depend in part on the degree of variety or differences among 
its constituent parts.49 Just as the greater complexity of chess
relative to checkersis, in part, a matter of the greater variety of 
chess pieces, so legal complexity reflects the degree of variance 
among constituent parts. 
 The number of elements constituting a legal rule or system, thus, 
need not be strongly correlated with the degree of differentiation 
among those elements. A game of checkers, as modified above to pro-
vide for hundreds of identical checkers on both sides, would, in this 
respect, be numerically far more complex than an ordinary game of 
chess. Chess, on the other hand, would still be more complex than 
any version of checkers with respect to differentiation among kinds of 
pieces. 
1.   Tax Code Example 
 Correspondingly, we can imagine a tax code that carefully listed, 
for each dollar increment in income, the ultimate tax due. This tax 
code could have millions, if not billions, of component sections, corre-
sponding to every level of income in dollar units. We might wish to 
say that this code really involves merely one very large tax table, but 
there is no reason in principle why it could not formally be arranged 
as a series of separate sections governing each single dollar income 
                                                                                                                      
 48. See, e.g., Nelson v. Freeland, 507 S.E.2d 882, 884-85 (N.C. 1998) (quoting OLeary 
v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1977)) (noting that a number of categorical excep-
tions and distinctions render premises liability law complex and confusing); Louis Kaplow, 
A Model of the Optimal Complexity of Legal Rules, 11 J.L. & ECON. ORG. 150, 150 (1995) 
(recognizing complexity as the number and difficulty of distinctions the rules make); 
Nancy Levit, Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 
FORDHAM L. REV. 263, 268 (1989); Lance W. Rook, Laying Down the Law: Canons For 
Drafting Complex Legislation, 72 OR. L. REV. 663, 670 (1993) (statutory cross-references as 
adding to complexity).  
 49. See, e.g., RESCHER, supra note 44, at 1, 9; SWINBURNE, supra note 46, at 13-14; 
Toran, supra note 44, at 361. 
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level. A person with a taxable income of, say, $27,253 would simply 
go to the single corresponding line of the tax table. 
 This possibility suggests two useful points. First, what is on some 
definitions quite complexas a million section tax code would be 
complex in terms of sheer number of elementsmay be easily rewri-
table in far fewer sections, involving one large tax table. As easily 
rewritten, a code loses its complexity in this numerical sense, and be-
comes much simpler. Thus millions of code sections can easily be re-
duced to one single, comprehensive code section. This begins to sug-
gest the superficiality, or the mere stylistic conventionality, if not the 
sheer arbitrariness of some judgments of complexity. 
 Second, while the tax code with millions of separate sections is 
complex in some sensesit has many working parts, and may be dif-
ficult or impossible to evade or contract around50in other respects, 
such a code is relatively simple. The millions of separate provisions 
are not, for example, all qualitatively different possible ways in 
which ones interest income or capital gains might be treated, all of 
which one may need to consider.51 Instead, one should, by our as-
sumption, be able to move quickly to the single section corresponding 
to ones own income level52 and instantly read ones final tax obliga-
tion from that section. The code sections, while numerous, are simple 
in some respects that we have already seen and in other respects we 
have yet to examine.53 Here again, various senses of complexity, even 
when they are not being reformulated in ways that make them sim-
ple, do not positively correlate with other senses of complexity. 
 To this point, however, we have still left the problem of legal com-
plexity vastly oversimplified. Imagine again a mosaic with a large 
number of tiles, and this time with a large variety of colors of tiles, 
but in which the tiles were arrayed in one simple endlessly repeated 
pattern: in the order corresponding to the visible light spectrum. 
Surely we would not see this simple and endlessly repeated pattern 
as approaching anything like the maximally complex mosaic.54 But 
even a more interesting pattern is not the end of the complexity 
story. 
                                                                                                                      
 50. Cf. EPSTEIN, supra note 1, at 27 (noting that non-evadable provisions are more 
complex than those that can be contracted around). 
 51. See id. (hypothetically referring to twenty-five possible tax treatments of interest 
income). 
 52. We shall set aside the simplicities, or complexities, involved in determining ones 
taxable income in the first place. 
 53. Crucial, of course, is that anyone can turn immediately to the single relevant sec-
tion, and quickly and easily grasp its decisive import. 
 54. For discussion of alternative mosaic tiling patterns that are simple in some re-
spects, yet rather more complex in others, consider the concept of Penrose tiles, as devel-
oped by Roger Penrose. See Joseph Malkevitch, Tilings and Patterns, 236 SCIENCE 996 
(1987); see also John Horgan, Quantum Consciousness: Polymath Roger Penrose Takes On 
the Ultimate Mystery, 261 SCI. AM. 30 (1989). 
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2.   Functional/Operational Complexity 
 At a minimum, we must now add the idea of the functional or op-
erational complexity of the elements of a legal system. If we think of 
chess as more complex than checkers, this is not merely because 
chess pieces vary more in their appearances or shapes, or even be-
cause the pattern of their initial deployment is more complex, but be-
cause chess pieces vary more in their functions, uses, and powers of 
movement.55 In this respect, a legal system that relied solely on a se-
ries of decrees would be less complex than a legal system in which 
constitutional provisions, statutes, regulations, judicial opinions, ex-
ecutive orders, attorney general opinions, decrees, and other sorts of 
law all played their diverse roles.56 These elements of a legal system 
could be diverse not only in content, but in their function or opera-
tion as well. They could vary along the dimensions of their jurisdic-
tional scope, the actors addressed by the law, the officials authorized 
to carry out the law, the degree of authoritativeness of the law, or 
even the degree of coerciveness involved.57 
 Functional or operational complexity is partially a matter of hier-
archy, either within a particular statute,58 for example, or more 
broadly, as among the varied elements of a legal system.59 The 
greater the number of hierarchical legal levels, all else equal, the 
more functionally or operationally complex the system is likely to be. 
Thus, federal constitutional provisions, federal statutes, and federal 
regulations addressing equality, along with state law at various lev-
els on the same subject, add complexity to the law of equality. But 
then, interestingly, any blurriness or equivocality in what might su-
perficially seem to be a clear vertical legal hierarchy60 can also be a 
form of complexity. The presence of clear hierarchical levels in a legal 
system may add to its complexity, but so does lack of clarity or lack of 
strictness in a purported hierarchy of levels.61 
                                                                                                                      
 55. This example is used in RESCHER, supra note 44, at 9. 
 56. For some of the complexities involved in sorting out the genuine differences in le-
gal function or operation, see R. George Wright, Two Models of Constitutional Adjudica-
tion, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1357 (1991). 
 57. Some laws, such as those prohibiting theft, are mandatory and coercive at their 
essence, whereas others, such as those establishing the essentials of a valid, legally en-
forceable will, are more directly a matter of empowerment or social coordination. See 
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 27-28 (2d ed. 1994). 
 58. See, e.g., Rook, supra note 48, at 670 ([T]he more tiers there are in a provision, 
the more complex it will be.). 
 59. See RESCHER, supra note 44, at 9 (referring to elaborateness of subordination re-
lationships in the modes of inclusion and subsumption). For some historic discussion, see 
Martin v. Hunters Lessee, 14 U.S. 304 (1816) (discussing federal-state judicial relations) 
and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (discussing federal-state legislative rela-
tions). 
 60. See Wright, supra note 56, at 1381. 
 61. Relationships of authority can be difficult to trace because what appear to be 
strictly hierarchical relationships really involve mutual incorporation or mutual influence. 
2000]                          ILLUSION OF SIMPLICITY 727 
 
 Functional or operational complexity, however, is hardly ex-
hausted by matters of hierarchy. Broader issues of the degree of or-
ganizational elaborateness and interrelatedness also arise. The parts 
of a legal system may be related to each other in more or less com-
plex ways, whether they are arranged in a neat hierarchy or not. A 
system might be organized, for example, in a neat pyramidal struc-
ture, with a strict hierarchy of levels. But this may tell us little about 
the degree of the systems complexity. If we build a pyramid out of 
sugar cubes as a school project, have we built a complex entity? 
 A pyramid of sugar cubes, even if multi-layered, does not suggest 
variety of constituent elements, or, more crucially, any sense of intri-
cacy, elaborateness of organizational or structural scheme, or any-
thing like richness and profusion. The sugar cubes do not interact 
among one another in a variety of interesting ways, qualify or am-
plify each others impact, feed back on one another, or cross-reference 
one another.62 Some cubes might even be removed without much af-
fecting distant or even nearby cubes. 
D.   Organizational and Relational Complexity 
 Complexity, whether of a legal or nonlegal sort, is, in some meas-
ure, a matter of organizational complexity.63 Organizational complex-
ity in turn may be a reflection of something like the elaborateness of 
structural64 interrelationships65 among the parts of a system. The 
greater the number and variety of ways in which the parts of a legal 
system interact, all else equal, the greater the complexity.66 Struc-
tural or relational complexity may even involve a sense of extrava-
gance,67 intricacy,68 or elaborateness.69 
 Relational complexity in a system may sometimes be associated 
with great numbers of elements of the system. But as the sugar cube 
pyramid suggests, we may also find great numbers of elements of a 
system, but little interactive complexity. On the other hand, every-
day experience with other people teaches us that relational complex-
                                                                                                                      
 62. We have already referred above to the density of cross-referencing among provi-
sions as a dimension of complexity. See Rook, supra note 48, at 670. 
 63. See, e.g., RESCHER, supra note 44, at 1, 9 (referring to the variety of different pos-
sible ways of arranging components in different modes of interrelationship). 
 64. See, e.g., Richard Rudner, An Introduction to Simplicity, 28 PHIL. SCI. 109, 110 
(1961) (referring, inter alia, to a structural dimension of simplicity or complexity). 
 65. See, e.g., Kades, supra note 29, at 413 (referring to interconnectedness as a di-
mension of tax law complexity) (quoting John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and 
Fairness: Justifying Rule Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 
(1993)). 
 66. See, e.g., SWINBURNE, supra note 46, at 13. 
 67. See S.F. Barker, On Simplicity in Empirical Hypotheses, 28 PHIL. SCI. 162, 165 
(1961). 
 68. See RESCHER, supra note 44, at 8. 
 69. See id. 
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ity can be found in the absence of great numbers of system elements. 
Notoriously, we can find great complexity of relationship between as 
few as two individual persons.70 We should not, therefore, expect a 
particularly strong correlation between complexity as sheer number 
and complexity as intricacy of relationship. 
 One could easily argue, for example, that there is greater complex-
ity in the relationship between two elements of the first amend-
mentthe Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause71
than there is between either of these clauses and the Second through 
Eighth Amendments combined.72 But then, the first eight amend-
ments may seem complex in some ways that may largely evaporate 
merely by changing our conventional frames of reference, or by trans-
lating one language of description into another.73 The first eight 
amendments may involve complex interrelationships that may come 
to seem less important if we reconceive of that series of separate pro-
visions as, instead, an underlyingly unified single entity known as 
the Bill of Rights.74 
E.   Ontological and Epistemical Complexity 
 As it turns out, even the various forms of legal complexity relate 
to one another in complex ways. Cutting across all of the above forms 
of complexity is a distinction between what we might call ontological 
complexity and epistemic complexity.75 A system, including a legal 
system, is ontologically complex if it is somehow in itself complex, 
                                                                                                                      
 70. See, e.g., the relationship between Dorothea and Mr. Casaubon in GEORGE ELIOT, 
MIDDLEMARCH (David Carroll ed., 1986), between Anna and Count Vronsky in LEO 
TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA (Constance Garnett trans., 1939), or between Edmund and 
Fanny in JANE AUSTEN, MANSFIELD PARK (1995). 
 71. See generally Jonathan E. Nuechterlein, Note, The Free Exercise Boundaries of 
Permissible Accommodation Under the Establishment Clause, 99 YALE L.J. 1127 (1990); 
Scott J. Ward, Note, Reconceptualizing Establishment Clause Cases as Free Exercise Class 
Actions, 98 YALE L.J. 1739 (1989). 
 72. The relationship between the Establishment Clause and, say, the bearing of arms, 
the quartering of soldiers, or the right to grand jury indictment seems not so much complex 
as merely contingent, or generally uninteresting. See, respectively, U.S. CONST. amends. I, 
III, IV & V. 
 73. See, e.g., Mario Bunge, The Weight of Simplicity in the Construction of Assaying of 
Scientific Theories, 59 J. PHIL. 120, 121 (1962) (referring to the possibility of reducing 
many postulates, by merely conjoining them, to one). 
 74. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 
(1991). This is not to deny that in light of other interests we may have, the complexity of 
relationships among the first eight amendments, or between one or more of those amend-
ments and other provisions of the Constitution, may seem more important. See AKHIL 
REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); see also, Akhil 
Reed Amar, Textualism and the Bill of Rights, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1143 (1998). Profes-
sor Amar refers to both intratextual cross-references within the Constitution, and inter-
textual cross-references between the Bill of Rights and earlier historical documents. See 
id. at 1143 
 75. This distinction is widely recognized and discussed, but it is emphasized in 
RESCHER, supra note 44, at 9. 
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apart from how simple or complex it is to understand (epistemically) 
or linguistically describe that system.76 This distinction seems con-
troversial: Is there really a way that a legal system is, in itself, apart 
from the ways it is described? Ultimately, though, this often seems to 
be a valid distinction, in that we can think of simple objects that are 
difficult to describe and complex objects that can be easily described. 
A photon, the basic unit of light, no less than, say, the concept of 
what is legally obscene, seems simple enough in itself, but describing 
either a photons behavior or the bounds of the legally obscene in an 
understandable, genuinely articulate way is surprisingly difficult.77 
 This distinction between the object and its description or under-
standing does however seem especially complex or even doubtful in 
the legal context. In some respects, it seems difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to separate what the law is from someones understanding or de-
scription of the law. Is there really a law of future interests apart 
from what someone understands that law to be?78 The laws of future 
interests cannot, in this sense, be like a genuine, but as yet undis-
covered, law of nature. On the other hand, it is easy to believe that 
the real operation of our legal system in its sociological and psycho-
logical dimensions could be partially unknown to us, and discover-
able only through special effort.79 In some respects, ontological and 
epistemic legal complexity are inseparable, but in other respects, 
they are not. 
 Where ontological and epistemic legal complexity can be sepa-
rated, should we nonetheless assume that they will be strongly posi-
                                                                                                                      
 76. See, e.g., Steven O. Kimbrough, On Simplicity as a Guide to Truth, 9 KINESIS 55, 
63-64 (1979); Daniel N. Osherson & Scott Weinstein, 57 PHIL. SCI. 266, 267 (1990) (distin-
guishing, in parallel fashion, between metaphysical simplicity and formal simplicity); 
Rudner, supra note 64, at 110. 
 77.  See, e.g., 1 R. FEYNMAN, R. LEIGHTON & M. SANDS, THE FEYNMAN LECTURES ON 
PHYSICS §§ 37-2 to 37-9 (1963) (discussing wave/particle dualism). One might contend that 
our verbal or mathematical description of a photon and its behavior is in itself simple, but 
that we do not know what to make of that simple description. Even if we say this, we are 
still left with a contrast between narrow descriptive simplicity and the difficulties involved 
in really understanding either our own description or the underlying phenomenon, the 
photon itself. In the context of obscenity, consider the oft-quoted assertion of Justice Potter 
Stewart that hard-core obscenity is both readily recognizable and difficult to legally define. 
See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964). This may not show that obscenity in itself 
is simple, but difficult to both know and describe. It may instead suggest a further compli-
cation: it may be simple to know or recognize a legal idea, but complex to describe or ar-
ticulate it. 
 78. For a possible alternative, see THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA I-II, ques-
tion 91, art. 1, in THE POLITICAL IDEAS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 11, 11-12 (Dino Bigon-
giari ed., 1953). 
 79. Consider, for example, the study conducted by David Baldus concerning the racial 
dimensions of death penalty cases referred to in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 286 
(1987), or, at a broader level, the study of economic and class dimensions of the law in 
CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES 33 (1913), and on the question of the authority of the law, TOM R. TYLER, WHY 
PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990). 
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tively correlated? Where the law in itself is simple, should we expect 
our descriptions of that law to be simple also? Light may be simple, 
but its description may not. As it turns out, any such general as-
sumption grossly oversimplifies legal reality. 
 One problem is that there are likely to be various ways of accu-
rately describing any legal reality. Perhaps none of these descrip-
tions of legal reality is simply wrong. Some may seem relatively sim-
ple, others more complex, and they may or may not also be mutually 
translatable. Different social groups may reasonably emphasize dif-
ferent legal dimensions. Police procedure in an arrest may be de-
scribed differently on different sides of town. In such cases, we can 
hardly say that the description of legal reality is just simple. Nor can 
we say that the legal reality is just complex. One dimension of the le-
gal complexity may be that some social groups perceive the law as 
relatively simple. Consistent group oppression, for example, may not 
require much descriptive complexity or much nuance. Some sort of 
choice, or choices, among alternative descriptions of simplicity and 
complexity, based on value judgments, must be made instead. 
 Consider a very loosely corresponding problem in mathematics. 
Assume there is a number called PI and that we want to describe it . 
Verbally, we can characterize PI  as the ratio of a circles circumfer-
ence to its diameter. Numerically, we can characterize PI as equal to 
3.1415926 . . . with a potentially endless succession of refining digits. 
Whether we choose the verbal or the numerical approach depends 
upon our interests, and we can certainly translate one approach into 
the other.  
 But we cannot say, however, that the two approaches are equally 
complex. At the very least, they are not equally complex in the same 
respects. The numerical approach is, depending on our interests, of 
potentially endless length, with an infinite number of digits involved. 
Beyond some point, the numbers cannot readily be memorized.  The 
numerical approach is in these respects complex. In contrast, the 
verbal formula for PI is simpler in that it is compact and can readily 
be memorized. The verbal formula may also be easy to visualize. On 
the other hand, if we want to do some sort of practical calculation, 
using the numerical formulation of PI, to all the decimal places we 
need, is a good deal more manageable and less complex than trying 
to use a visual image or a verbal formula.80 
                                                                                                                      
 80. A bit more realistically, early twentieth-century physicists faced a choice, based 
on their own interests, between two actually equivalent, but more and less complicated ap-
proaches to the development of quantum mechanics. See, e.g., David C. Cassidy, Heisen-
berg, Uncertainty, and the Quantum Revolution, 266 SCI. AM. 106, 109 (1992) (contrasting 
Erwin Schrodingers wave mechanical approach with Werner Heisenberg matrix mechani-
cal approach, with each taking the others approach to be generally more complicated, if 
not repellant). 
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 Consider, now, an example from the law. Let us assume that there 
is a difference between free speech law and descriptions, understand-
ings, or declarations of free speech law. In this case, the ontological 
complexity of free speech law (in itself) might then either mirror or 
depart from its epistemic (or descriptive) complexity. Is there any 
reason to suppose that the ontological complexity of free speech law 
must march in lockstep with its epistemic complexity? Is it not 
equally plausible to argue that given its phrasing and underlying 
purposes, free speech law, itself, may actually be simple, and its in-
terpretation or description quite complex? We often suppose that we 
are trying to somehow correctly interpret what amounts to a brief, 
readily memorized, simply formulated passage in the First Amend-
ment.81 For whatever reasons, our attempts at interpreting what is in 
several respects a simple constitutional command in the first 
amendment have resulted in a remarkably complex descriptive en-
terprise. 
 Thus while the text of the Free Speech Clause, and perhaps even 
its purposes, may seem simple enough, a search of a standard legal 
research database turned up 14,515 federal court decisions at least 
referring to free speech or freedom of speech, most presumably in-
terpreting and applying that apparently simple constitutional 
clause.82 Many of these cases are not purely mechanical exercises. In 
this respect, we seem to have both ontological legal simplicity and 
epistemic legal complexity. These two forms of legal complexity thus 
do not seem to march hand in hand. 
 It is certainly possible to try to establish a stronger correlation be-
tween ontological and epistemic legal complexity. It is perfectly natu-
ral, for example, to say that the 14,515 federal free speech cases are 
themselves part of the being or entity of free speech law itself, 
rather than merely epistemic attempts to interpret, report, or de-
scribe an underlying entity known as free speech law. On this justifi-
able approach, free speech law is apparently quite complex. However, 
no interesting correlation is established between the degree of onto-
logical complexity and the degree of epistemic or descriptive complex-
ity of free speech law. On such an assumption, we are now assuming 
that free speech law itself is monumentally complex. 
                                                                                                                      
 81. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom 
of speech . . . .). For some complications even at this textual level, see, for example, Mark 
P. Denbeaux, The First Word of the First Amendment, 80 NW. U.L. REV. 1156, 1158 (1986) 
(discussing the apparent textual focus on congressional action); John Paul Stevens, The 
Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1296 (1993) (arguing that the presence of the arti-
cle the suggests a reference to some identifiable institution, practice, or subset of the 
broader category of speech). 
 82. The Westlaw ALLFEDS database retrieved this remarkable number as of Janu-
ary 30, 1999. 
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 If the case law interpretations are just part of the underlying en-
tity of free speech itself, we would then have to ask whether our de-
scription or understanding of that large body of free speech case law 
must be comparably complex. This is hardly assured. Complicated 
things, such as the numerical PI, may have quite simple verbal or 
visual descriptions. By comparison, a parallel search for federal cases 
referring to second amendment or to the phrase bear arms 
yielded 1,526 cases,83 or only about one-ninth of the total free speech 
cases. Can we conclude both that the Free Speech Clause is much 
more complex than the Second Amendment, and that the Second 
Amendment is easier to grasp than free speech? 
 We might ask whether our leading theories and interpretations of 
this assumedly complex free speech law are themselves proportion-
ately complex. It is hard to see why we must say so. Admittedly, most 
of our rather diverse leading theories of free speech law are not espe-
cially difficult to capsulize.84 Many of their more detailed conclusions 
may not flow from their basic premises any more rigorously than 
some alternative conclusions. The theories often agree on much and 
thus substantially overlap. That free speech theorists differ does not 
make their theories complex. Even if we choose to call our leading 
free speech theories complex, it is not easy to see why they are more 
complex than our leading theories of the assumedly less complex 
Second Amendment. Is it clear that we understand the Second 
Amendment better than the free speech clause? 
 Undoubtedly, there is far greater academic or theoretical interest 
in free speech law than in Second Amendment law.85 Our stake in 
free speech is doubtless higher. Free speech cases are understanda-
bly litigated far more often. But this hardly means that our leading 
free speech theory is much more complex than our leading second 
amendment theory. It is not as though there is some patent under-
standing of the Second Amendment, applicable by consensus to the 
major Second Amendment contexts. However we come out on this 
comparison, it is but one example.  
                                                                                                                      
 83. This figure was also obtained from the Westlaw ALLFEDS database on January 
30, 1999. Admittedly, these two searches are not comprehensive in formulation and scope, 
or even structurally parallel, but the basic proportions seem evident. 
 84. See, e.g., C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH (1989); LEE 
BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986); OWEN M. FISS, THE IRONY OF FREE SPEECH 
(1996); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982); STEVEN H. 
SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990); RODNEY A. 
SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN SOCIETY (1992); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND 
THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH (1993). 
 85. A search of the Westlaw Journals and Law Reviews database on January 30, 1999 
yielded a total of 574 articles with either free speech or freedom of speech in their title, 
and only 84 articles with either second amendment or bear arms in their title. But see 
supra note 84. 
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 In general, and more broadly, we do not see any clear association 
between the complexity of the law itself and the complexity of any 
given attempt to describe or justify that law.86 Again by way of anal-
ogy, a remarkably complicated decimal series might be quite simply 
described, perhaps, as the square root of two. If, on the other hand, 
we deny any contrast between ontological and epistemic legal com-
plexity, we still cannot escape epistemic legal complexity in a broadly 
pragmatic sense.87  
 This pragmatic sense of epistemic complexity focuses on the re-
sources . . . of time, energy, [and] ingenuity88 required for the cogni-
tive domestication89 of a legal system, code, rule, or opinion. A sys-
tem, whether legal90 or non-legal,91 that is easier to understand than 
another is, in that pragmatic respect, simpler. For instance, it has 
been said that one form of simplicity involves memorability.92 In this 
sense, [t]he simpler statement is easier to remember.93 Alterna-
tively, epistemic complexity in the broad pragmatic sense may take 
the form of relying on transcendent or generalized94 concepts. In 
some sense, deep or transcendent ideas obviously involve complexity. 
It seems undeniable that legal rules that are easy to remember
whether we include the Free Speech Clause or notmay be complex 
in one or more other respects. Legal rules regarding perpetuities, 
cause-in-fact, or proximate cause, for example, may be easy to state 
or memorize but difficult and costly to use and apply. 
 Each of the dimensions of epistemic complexity is, at least in part, 
a matter of how the system, code, rule, or opinion is linguistically ex-
pressed.95 Consider, for example, a hypothetical criminal code con-
sisting, in its entirety, of the injunction to avoid evil.96 This code is 
epistemically complex in relying on generalized or transcendent 
                                                                                                                      
 86. Broadening the focus, in an admittedly rather speculative way, to constitutional 
theory more generally, it would be easy to argue that our leading general constitutional 
theories are not much more complex than are theories of any particular constitutional pro-
vision. Perhaps the most complex leading general constitutional theory is that developed 
by Professor Phillip Bobbitt. See PHILLIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 7. (1982). 
Therein, Professor Bobbitt argues that there are no more and no less than six equal status 
modes of constitutional interpretation. See id. (referring to the historical, textual, doc-
trinal, prudential, structural, and ethical modes of constitutional interpretation). 
 87. See  Bunge, supra note 73, at 121. 
 88. RESCHER, supra note 44, at 16. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Kaplow, supra note 48, at 150. 
 91. See Raymond D. Havens, Simplicity, a Changing Concept, 14 J. HIST. IDEAS 3, 22 
(1953) (noting one style of landscape architecture as simpler in the sense of being more 
regular and having a more readily apprehended plan). 
 92. See H.R. Post, Simplicity in Scientific Theories, 11 BRIT. J. PHIL. SCI. 32, 35 
(1960). 
 93. Id. 
 94. Levit, supra note 48, at 268. 
 95. See Osherson & Weinstein, supra note 76, at 267. 
 96. Cf. AQUINAS, supra note 78, at 57-59 question 94, art. 2 ([E]vil is to be avoided.). 
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ideas,97 but it is exceptionally simple in the dimensions of brevity and 
concision, and in number of elements.98 It is also simple in the sense 
of being easily committed to memory.99 Whether it is simple in the 
sense of having its concrete implications readily graspable100 is an-
other matter. This will, in part, be a function of the culture in which 
this rule is embedded. An unusually homogeneous, authoritarian, 
traditionalist culture may usually agree on what counts as avoiding 
evil; other cultures will not. 
 In the extreme case, any member of that assumed, unusually ho-
mogeneous culture may be able to translate the injunction to avoid 
evil into remarkably detailed, more or less culturally uncontroversial 
precepts. The general injunction to avoid evil may, for that culture, 
be nearly equivalent to some long, detailed code on which there is a 
consensus. So in which senses can we say that such a criminal code 
is, for any given culture, or across cultures, simple or complex? Some 
cultures may find that such a brief, general criminal code can be un-
controversially translated into a much more elaborate form, and un-
controversially applied. Some cultures may not even need to make 
any such conscious translation. Our culture, certainly, could not 
make an uncontroversial translation of avoid evil. 
 We have seen that expressing the idea of PI in different waysas 
a ratio, and as an irrational numbermay involve different forms of 
complexity.101 Notoriously, a given idea may be easily expressed in 
one language, but difficult to convey accurately in another lan-
guage.102 Difficult issues of what we might call formal,103 or nota-
tional,104 or even stylistic105 complexity are inescapable. 
 One translation of a tax code provision may be complex in some 
respects, where another translation of the same provision may be 
simpler in those respects, yet more complex in others. Boris Bittker 
has argued for tax code provisions that are understandable, at least 
                                                                                                                      
 97. See Levit, supra note 48, at 268. 
 98. See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text. 
 99. See supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text. 
 101. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. 
 102. The words quantum and theory are themselves of ancient origin, but it would 
undoubtedly be rather difficult to translate WERNER HEISENBERGS, PHYSICAL PRINCIPLES 
OF THE QUANTUM THEORY (Carl Eckart & Frank C. Hoyt trans., 1930) into Latin without 
creativity and inevitable cumbersomeness. 
 103. See Rom Harre, Simplicity as a Criterion of Induction, 34 PHIL. 229, 229 (1959) 
(seeking to distinguish formal simplicity from conceptual simplicity, or the fewness of con-
cepts required to convey a given theory). 
 104. See Rudner, supra note 64, at 110 (seeking to distinguish notational from logical 
and structural simplicity). 
 105. See Boris I. Bittker, Tax Reform and Tax Simplification, 29 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 
12-13 (1974). 
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to legal non-specialists, if not to ordinary citizens.106 He argues in 
particular that [a]n individual may deduct is simpler and better 
than [i]n the case of an individual, . . . there shall be allowed as a 
deduction.107 We may assume that the former is indeed stylistically 
simpler. But it may, in another sense, be more complex. The admit-
tedly cumbersome language of in the case of an individual suggests 
the exclusion of other kinds of taxpaying entities to a somewhat 
greater degree than does the reference merely to an individual. To 
merely say that an individual can do something does not suggest 
quite as strongly that other kinds of entities cannot also do the same 
thing. The stylistically simpler formulation thus invites more litiga-
tion on this important issue. One could thus argue more broadly that 
the stylistically simpler formulation holds open more issues and en-
courages more litigation, and is in a practical sense more complex. 
 It should not surprise us that stylistic simplicity may often leave 
open more avenues for litigation, and, in that sense, be more com-
plex. At the very least, stylistic simplicity often shifts complex de-
terminations into the future. We may say that plain language draft-
ing often sacrifices some forms of simplicity over the long term for 
simplicity in the short term. Stylistic complexity today is usually 
easy to recognize and dislike. Adjudicative complexities postponed 
until tomorrow are less easy to recognize today. Failing to fully ap-
preciate or admit such a tradeoff is certainly common. The federal 
governments current regulatory policy, for example, embodies this il-
lusion. An important executive order holds, in particular, that [e]ach 
agency shall draft its regulations to be simple and easy to under-
stand, with the goal of minimizing the potential for uncertainty and 
litigation arising from such uncertainty.108 Maximizing stylistic sim-
plicity and minimizing litigation born of uncertainty are both desir-
able, but they are not really compatible goals. 
 Plain and simple regulations typically invite litigation and inter-
pretive struggle. A regulation requiring, for example, that a hazard-
ous waste site be cleaned up would be stylistically simple, and easy 
to grasp superficially, but would give no guidance, for example, on 
                                                                                                                      
 106. See id. at 13; Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 
YALE L.J. 65, 68 (1983) (The desire to make legal rules more accessible motivates recur-
rent calls for simplification of convoluted regimes like the tax code.). 
 107. Bittker supra note 105, at 12. 
 108. Exec. Order No. 12866, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993). For a recent case in which consti-
tutional due process issues hinge largely on drafting complexity, see Walters v. Reno, 145 
F.3d 1032, 1042 (9th Cir. 1998). For discussion of some ideological uses of stylistic obscu-
rity, see Laura E. Little, Hiding With Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Juris-
diction Opinions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1998). For extensive discussion of the related dis-
tinction between mud and crystal rules, see Carol M. Rose, Crystals and Mud in Prop-
erty Law, 40 STAN. L. REV. 577, 578 (1988) (distinguishing fuzzy, ambiguous rules as op-
posed to clear, open and shut, demarcations). 
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the crucial issue of how clean is clean.109 One might respond by say-
ing that regulations that give little real guidance cannot truly be 
readily graspable, or genuinely simple in language, form, or style. 
But this is either not always true, or it shows that there are more, 
and more poorly correlated forms of complexity than we imagined. 
Simple language can sometimes give little concrete guidance, as in 
the case of the injunction to avoid evil. It is certainly possible, as 
well, to reduce litigation by providing clearly in the regulation itself 
for the proper outcomes of some common kinds of specific cases. 
 In fact, there is plainly more than one form of stylistic complexity, 
and these forms of stylistic complexity need not correlate well with 
each other. We commonly distinguish, for example, between semantic 
simplicity110 and syntactic simplicity. Semantics refers to the mean-
ing of some unit or level of a system, legal or otherwise.111 Syntax, in 
contrast, refers to the grammatical or other structural relationships 
in a unit of legal or other expression. Somewhat different definitions 
of syntax and semantics are certainly possible.112 We could, in any 
event, easily imagine a statute or other legal text that is semanti-
cally simple and syntactically complex, or vice versa. In this context, 
as in the others considered above, legal complexity is itself almost 
bewilderingly complex, with the various forms of legal complexity 
cutting across or otherwise failing to correlate with one another. 
III.   OUR INABILITY TO MEASURE COMPLEXITY:  SOME DEEPER 
ISSUES, ILLUSTRATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS 
 Even at its barest and simplest, complexity has turned out to be 
complicated.113 We have oversimplified by assuming generally that 
cases of most of the various forms of complexity will be obvious, when 
                                                                                                                      
 109. See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE 
RISK REGULATION 11-12 (1993). For the more general point that statutory or regulatory 
formal simplicity may simply shift complexity forward in time, to the forum of litigation, 
see Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2010 (1989). 
 110. See, e.g., Levit, supra note 48, at 268; Bunge, supra note 73, at 121. 
 111. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Power-
lessness in Police Interrogation, 103 YALE L.J. 259, 276 n.62 (1993); Brian Leiter, Incom-
mensurability: Truth or Consequences?, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 1725 (1998). 
 112. See supra notes 110-111 (linking syntax to form or structure, and semantics to 
presuppositions); REED DICKERSON, MATERIALS ON LEGAL DRAFTING 33 (1981) (semantics, 
in part, as a matter of reference). 
 113. See discussion supra Part II. For a further puzzle from the more antiseptic realm 
of simple mathematics, consider which is simpler: the fraction 1/3, or the fraction 1/500. 
The first requires fewer digits, and is more readily memorized, but it is irrational, and for 
some purposes infinitely more complicated, or at least lengthier, when expressed as a 
decimal. See Robert Ackerman, Inductive Simplicity, 28 PHIL. SCI. 152, 154 (1961) (com-
paring 1/3 and 1/10). 
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in fact, legal complexities are sometimes submerged.114 Even an 
oversimplified analysis, however, can establish some useful conclu-
sions. We cannot, for example, just decide that the law in general, or 
even some particular law, is too complex and should be simplified. 
Our point is not that just simplifying a law is politically difficult or 
undesirable. It is, instead, that it is conceptually impossible. By way 
of an extremely loose analogy, some things can be readily simplified 
in the sense of being compressed, and other things cannot. It is thus 
much easier, for example, to compact a cubic foot of household trash 
than a cubic foot of water. Our inability to just compress or simplify 
the law goes beyond practical difficulties to a more conceptual level.  
A.   The Hearsay Rule Example 
 To further illustrate these points, let us consider an additional ex-
ample or two. We may profitably focus on areas of the law that are 
thought of as complex. Let us focus first on the hearsay rule, and 
then on a problem within free speech law. Certainly, the evidentiary 
hearsay rule, along with its many exceptions, is commonly thought of 
as relatively complex.115 But even the hearsay rule cannot be complex 
in every respect. We may certainly rank the hearsay rule, with its 
exceptions, as complex in the sense of involving many exceptions.116 
Perhaps we can say that the hearsay rule with its exceptions is op-
erationally complex.117 The rule with its exceptions may also be epis-
temically complex, at least in the sense of being difficult to memorize, 
if not to grasp.118 
 The hearsay rule, even with its exceptions, does not on the other 
hand seem especially complex in other respects. We may think of the 
hearsay rule as having many parts, but we could easily reduce the 
number of parts of the rule by merely conjoining them into one (rela-
tively long) formulation.119 Do we think of the hearsay rule as having 
great variety among its parts?120 Is the hearsay rule complex in a hi-
erarchical or other organizational sense?121 Can parties not often 
                                                                                                                      
 114. The constitutional references to cases or controversies has, for example, been said 
to have an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged com-
plexities . . . . Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co. Inc., 424 U.S. 747, 754 (1976) (quoting Flast 
v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968)). 
 115. See, e.g., People v. Pennington, 318 N.W.2d 542, 546 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (refer-
ring to the complexity of the hearsay rule and the numerous exceptions thereto) (quoting 
People v. Moncure, 288 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980)); Henslee v. Monks, 571 
P.2d 440, 442 n.2 (Okla. 1977) (referring to the complexity of the subject of hearsay) 
(quoting Smith v. Munger, 532 P.2d 1202, 1207 (Okla. Ct. App. 1974)). 
 116. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48. 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 54-57. 
 118. See supra text accompanying notes 75-77, 87-89. 
 119. See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
 120. See supra text accompanying note 49. 
 121. See supra text accompanying notes 58-69. 
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stipulate or contract around the hearsay rule?122 Do more assump-
tions underlie the hearsay rule than other rules?123 Is the hearsay 
rule semantically124 or syntactically125 complex? Could we not con-
clude that the hearsay rule is complex in some respects and simple in 
others, perhaps precisely because it is complex in those initial re-
spects? Whether the hearsay rule is really complex is, at worst, ir-
relevant or unanswerable, and, at best, a matter of a contestable 
judgment of typically conflicting values and interests. 
 Thus, a lawyer who sees the complexities of the hearsay rule as a 
barrier to personal entry,126 or as a disincentive to compete with es-
tablished litigators, and who views this as important, will likely see 
the hearsay rule as complex. A law student who is required to memo-
rize and apply all of the hearsay exceptions will likely see the rule as 
complex also. These may be the most commonly encountered perspec-
tives on the hearsay rule, but they certainly do not exhaust all the 
potential perspectives. A litigator already an expert on hearsay, who 
faces low compliance costs,127 may consider the hearsay rule sim-
pler than other less easily grasped rules. Someone interested in the 
structure of the legal system128 may not consider the hearsay rule 
particularly complex. A legal theorist who is interested in the pur-
poses of particular laws may well believe that the purpose of the 
hearsay rule and its exceptions is relatively simple.129 A legal seman-
ticist may find the hearsay rule simpler than, say, most modern 
statutory provisions. The hearsay rule can be stated in relatively 
simple words; no special terminology or technical terms need be in-
voked. 
 The view that the hearsay rule is particularly complex is  held 
more commonly than the opposite, but such a view is not, on that ba-
sis, more genuinely correct. Whether we see the hearsay rule as com-
plex or as simple is instead a reflection of which of the various le-
gitimate interests and perspectives we identify with most strongly. 
Neither general view is better than the other. 
                                                                                                                      
 122. See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 44-49. 
 124. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05, 110-15. 
 125. See id. 
 126. For some informal discussion of this concept in other contexts, see Panel Discus-
sion: Market Power and Entry Barriers, 57 ANTITRUST L.J. 701 (1989). 
 127. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. 
 128. See, e.g., HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cali-
fornia Press 2d ed. 1967). 
 129. Someone might imagine, for example, that both the rule itself and the exceptions 
reflect a moderate distrust of ordinary jurors. See, e.g., Kenneth Culp Davis, Hearsay in 
Nonjury Cases, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1365 (1970). 
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B.   The Public Forum Debates 
 We see a generally similar, but richer, pattern in the context of 
free speech law. The free speech clause of the Constitution130 is itself 
short,131 simply phrased,132 and unitary.133 Arguably, the Free Speech 
Clause may be viewed as having only a single underlying purpose.134 
On the other hand, one could equally argue that the primary pur-
poses underlying the Free Speech Clause are irreducibly multiple.135 
It seems entirely sensible to argue that free speech law should, in 
some fashion, be informed by the complex tangle of social, political, 
and cultural interests in limiting speech as well as protecting it, for 
the tension between individual rights and community needs is at the 
core of every First Amendment issue.136 There are certainly a num-
ber of somewhat distinct free speech doctrines and judicial tests,137 
but the degree to which this apparent differentiation conceals a 
deeper unity is contested.138 
 Free speech law is thus complex in a number of respects, and sim-
ple in others. Whether we call free speech complex  depends upon our 
contestable choices of the characteristics we wish to attach most 
weight to. The problem of assigning some particular degree of com-
plexity to any area of free speech law is itself more complex. Some 
areas of free speech law, and some particular free speech tests, can 
easily be described as either simple or complex. 
 Consider, for example, the current state of the public forum doc-
trine, the law that purportedly controls the government regulation of 
speech by private parties on or through government-owned prop-
erty.139 Public forum doctrine recognizes three categories of public 
                                                                                                                      
 130. U.S. CONST. amend. I (Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech). 
 131. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48. 
 132. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05, 110-15. 
 133. See supra text accompanying notes 44-48. 
 134. See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971). In a broader sense, see Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, in THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS IN THE MODERN STATE 255, 301 (Geoffrey R. Stone et al. eds., 1992). 
 135. See, e.g., Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982); 
Steven Shiffrin, The First Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General 
Theory of the First Amendment, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1213 (1983). 
 136. Z.J. Gifts D-2 v. City of Aurora, 136 F.3d 683, 686 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 137. See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1087-1529 (3d ed. 
1996) (discussing free speech tests for a number of contexts, including, subversive advo-
cacy, speech by public school students, public employee speech, libel, commercial speech, 
labor union elections, pornography, hate speech, etc.). 
 138. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text. For an attempt, in another con-
text, to reduce complexity in free speech law, see R. George Wright, The Unnecessary Com-
plexity of Free Speech Law and the Central Importance of Alternative Speech Channels, 9 
PACE L. REV. 57 (1989). 
 139. See, e.g., International Socy For Krishna Consciousness Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 
(1992); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense 
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fora. The first category is that of traditional public fora,140 such as 
public parks and downtown sidewalks, where free speech is strongly 
protected.141 More relevant for our purposes are the second and third: 
the designated public forum and the nonpublic forum. 
 The distinction between designated public fora and nonpublic fora 
is important, as the tests for permissible restriction of speech in 
these two types of fora differ significantly. Generally, restrictions on 
speech in designated public fora are strongly disfavored, ordinarily 
drawing strict scrutiny, as in the case of traditional public fora.142 
Thus, restrictions on access to designated public fora ordinarily are 
tested by requiring a compelling governmental interest and narrow 
tailoringin other words, a close fit between the governmental pur-
pose and the scope of the restriction on speech.143 By contrast, the 
general constitutional test for restrictions on speech in nonpublic 
fora is more lenient. Such restrictions need only be reasonable144 
and not based on opposition to the restricted speakers point of 
view.145 
 Thus restrictions on, or exclusions from, designated public fora 
are more difficult to justify than in the case of nonpublic fora. But 
this difference will come into play only after we have decided that a 
given forum is either a designated forum or a nonpublic forum in the 
first place. And this choice, in turn, should depend upon the judicial 
definitions of these two kinds of fora. But it is these definitions, and 
the distinction between the two fora, that raise the difficult prob-
lems. 
 A designated public forum, we are told, refers to property that 
the State has opened for expressive activity by all or part of the pub-
lic.146 Even in a designated public forum, some portion of the range 
of potential speakers can be excluded.147 Designated public fora, 
                                                                                                                      
& Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); Perry Education Assn v. Perry Local Educators Assn, 
460 U.S. 37 (1983). 
 140. See, e.g., Perry Education Assn, 460 U.S. at 45 (recognizing that the government 
is limited when regulating speech in traditional public fora.) 
 141. See, e.g., Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800 (permitting government exclusion of a speaker 
from such a forum only where necessary to serve a compelling state interest and the ex-
clusion is narrowly drawn to achieve that interest). See also Chicago Acorn v. Metropoli-
tan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 695, 699-700 (7th Cir. 1998). 
 142. See Arkansas Educ. Television Commn v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677-79 (1998) 
(recognizing that the government must have a compelling interest to regulate speech in a 
public forum.) 
 143. See id.; see also Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800. 
 144. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677-79. 
 145. See id.; Sefick v. Gardner, 164 F.3d 370, 371-73 (7th Cir. 1998) (When deciding 
what may be displayed in a nonpublic forum, the government may exercise considerable 
selectivity . . . provided it does not transgress basic anti-discrimination rules.). 
 146. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677 (quoting International Socy for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992)). 
 147. See id. 
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therefore, are typically available for only a particular class of speak-
ers.148 The law distinguishes between access for individual speakers 
and access for a class of speakers.149 Whole classes of speakers can 
thus be excluded from designated public fora. 
 How, we might then wonder, does a nonpublic forum differ from a 
designated public forum? The distinction exists between general and 
selective access to the forum.150 But what we have already said about 
designated public fora sounds like selective access.151 What is the real 
difference between the accessibility of designated public fora and of 
nonpublic fora? To clarify the distinction, the Supreme Court has 
said that a designated public forum involves access for a certain 
class of speakers,152 whereas a nonpublic forum involves access for a 
particular class of speakers153 who must, as groups or individuals, 
obtain permission before using the facility for speech purposes.154 
 Thus, at this point there is either supposed to be a crucial differ-
ence between a certain class (designated public fora) and a par-
ticular class (nonpublic fora) of speakers, which seems highly 
unlikely, or between something like a need for repeated or particular-
ized government permission to speak and the absence of such a re-
quirement. On the latter theory, the select class would need some 
sort of permission to speak in nonpublic fora, but not in designated 
public fora. But the latter distinction seems doubtful at best. Surely, 
for example, college students must often, as groups or individuals, 
obtain permission to use public university facilities for speech pur-
poses, even if the facility is classed as a designated public forum. Col-
lege students, as groups or individuals, do not simply waltz into des-
ignated public fora such as public university auditoriums and begin 
speaking. Access to designated public fora typically requires permis-
sion. 
 At a minimum, public universities will want to require such per-
mission in order to allocate limited space when potentially conflicting 
demands arise. Individualized permission requirements may be im-
posed regarding both designated public fora and nonpublic fora. Is 
the idea then that in the case of nonpublic fora, access may be denied 
on more substantive grounds, apart from scheduling conflicts? This 
idea will not help us distinguish designated from nonpublic fora. Ac-
                                                                                                                      
 148. See id. at 677 (citing, among other cases, United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 
726-27) (OConnor, J., for the plurality)). 
 149. See id. at 677. 
 150. See id.; see also Chicago Acorn v. Metropolitan Pier & Exposition Auth., 150 F.3d 
695, 700 (7th Cir. 1998) (indicating selectivity and restriction of access as marking a non-
public forum). 
 151. See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.  
 152. Forbes, 118 S. Ct. at 1642. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id. (discussing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 (1981)). 
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cess to designated public fora can be denied on substantive grounds 
as well, such as an insufficiently clear attachment to the univer-
sity.155 
 If there is any real difference between a designated public forum 
and a nonpublic forum, that difference is, even at a theoretical level, 
modest, if not elusive.156 The former kind of forum evokes a more rig-
orous constitutional test than the latter, but the difference between 
the two fora is minimal at best. Both can be restricted to a class of 
permitted speakers, and both can involve continuing non-trivial ac-
cess permission requirements. 
 This quite minimal difference between designated and nonpublic 
fora thus leaves the outcome of many public forum cases almost com-
pletely indeterminate. As a practical matter, great discretion is held 
by courts in making this often decisive classification. What, then, can 
be said about the degree of complexity of free speech law in this re-
spect? Unavoidably, we must again say that this aspect of public fo-
rum doctrine is both relatively simple and extremely complex. The 
distinction between the two kinds of fora is binary, is supposed to be 
expressed briefly in simple terms, and the doctrine evokes two 
clearly stated corresponding tests. On the other hand, the distinction 
between the two kinds of fora is elusive in practice, leading to enor-
mous indeterminacy of judicial outcome. If we are able to predict how 
a judge will use this distinction, this reflects only minimally our 
knowledge of the facts and the law, and far more our knowledge of 
the particular judges proclivities and practices. 
 In this respect, we may say that the apparent simplicity of this 
aspect of the public forum doctrine is largely an illusion. It may be 
quite simple for a cynical or realistic judge to choose a preferred clas-
sification and then rationalize the choice. The apparent simplicity is 
really a matter of displacing or shifting the complexity onto those ac-
tors who must predict what courts will do, and onto those actors who 
wish to make free speech law determinate in this areaand in that 
sense simple.  
 Matters are far from simple for those who must predict how courts 
in general will apply this distinction between the two kinds of fora. 
More broadly, we may say that both the real and apparent simplicity 
of the Free Speech Clause is mainly a matter of projecting the com-
plexities across time onto those who devise constitutional doctrines 
and tests, and, then, onto those who must predict judicial outcomes 
                                                                                                                      
 155. See id.; see also Widmar, 454 U.S. at 268 (We have not held . . . that a campus 
must make all of its facilities equally available to student[s] and nonstudents alike, or that 
a university must grant free access to all of its grounds or buildings.). 
 156. For a broader critique of the public forum doctrine, see Daniel A. Farber & John 
E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analysis: Content and Context in First 
Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219 (1984). 
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and apply the doctrines and tests in their own lives as citizens and 
government officials. 
 Could the public forum doctrine, and other areas of free speech 
law, be made more determinate, and, at least in that respect, sim-
pler? Certainly; but transforming the open-ended nature of public fo-
rum doctrine into a more determinate, more predictable form is itself 
complex work. More importantly, when we have finished this work, 
so that we now understand the boundary between designated and 
nonpublic fora in various contexts, in all their concrete particularity, 
we will unavoidably have a legal understanding of that distinction 
that has itself become quite complex. If such an understanding does 
not amount to a vast catalog of particular institutional and speaker 
circumstances of every variety, with the preferred outcomes for each, 
it must at least approach that cumbersome extreme.  
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 
 The law in general, and individual laws in particular, cannot be 
just simplified; this is not so much because the law in practice resists 
simplification, but for deeper reasons. As we have seen, simplifying a 
law in some respect hardly guarantees that the law will be simplified 
in all respects. Typically, as we have seen, legal complexity, in one 
respect, is at best uncorrelated with legal complexity in other re-
spects.157 Simplifying a law in one respect typically leaves the law 
complex in other respects. Indeed, simplifying a law in one respect 
may well make that law, or some other law, more complex in other 
respects, now or in the future.158 
 We face rather difficult questions of value and conflicting interests 
before we can, on the basis of those contestable value judgments, 
conclude that we have really simplified the law. To say otherwise 
would be like claiming that it is just really desirable that some par-
ticular baseball team win the next World Series. Contestable value 
judgments underlie such claims. 
                                                                                                                      
 157. See discussion supra Part II. For additional theoretical support, see, for example, 
McCaffery, supra note 1, at 1270 ([S]ome very simple terms yield a dizzying array of in-
terpretations . . . . In sum, there is no consistent correlation among statutory mass, ab-
struseness, and complexity.). 
 158.  See discussion supra Part II. For additional theoretical support, see Steven Walt, 
Book Review, 109 ETHICS 193, 194 (1998) (reviewing RICHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR 
A COMPLEX WORLD (1995) and noting that [t]he different criteria sometimes work against 
each other) and John A. Miller, Indeterminacy, Complexity, and Fairness: Justifying Rule 
Simplification in the Law of Taxation, 68 WASH. L. REV. 1, 13 (1993) (explaining that, in 
tax law, the use of elaborative complexity is intended to reduce judgmental [i.e., interpre-
tive] complexity). See also, J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 
YALE L.J. 743, 746-47 (1987) (referring to Jacques Derridas citation of the simple and the 
complex as a hierarchical opposition that is subject to inversion or temporary reversal). 
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 Even this limited possibility for legal simplification assumes that 
what we take as a laws simplicity cannot be redescribed as complex. 
But this is itself an oversimplification. As we have seen, a description 
of the law as simple can often be translated into a description 
marking the law as complex.159 This possibility further muddies the 
waters. 
 Finally, even if we can all agree that we have simplified the law in 
some respect, we may have only displaced the complexity of the law 
forward or backward in the overall lawmaking and implementation 
process, or we may have merely shifted the complexity to some other 
element of the broader political system. Simplicity in style or vocabu-
lary may store up uncertainties for future litigation. Ultimately, the 
law is as simple or as complex as it is, in whatever respect, because 
that degree of simplicity or complexity is consistent with the current, 
broad balance of legal and political forces. Wanting the law to be 
simpler, in some respect, is merely a part of the play of such legal 
and political forces and does not transcend the play of such forces. 
 Determinacy and predictability in the law are thus purchased 
only at the cost of introducing great complexity in other arguably im-
portant respects. Substantial complexity in the law is, again, in this 
respect inescapable. The quest for real simplification in the law re-
mains hopeless. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 159. See discussion supra Part II. For some additional discussion, see, for example, 
Balkin, supra note 158, at 746-47. Within a narrower Anglo-American philosophical tradi-
tion, see Bunge, supra note 73, at 121 (stating that the number of elements in a system 
can, at least in a sense, be reduced to one by merely combining them); Nelson Goodman, 
Safety, Strength, Simplicity, 28 PHIL. SCI. 150, 151 (1961) ([W]e can always, by a calcu-
lated selection of vocabulary, translate any hypothesis into one of minimal length . . . ) 
and Willard Van Orman Quine, On Simple Theories of a Complex World, 15 SYNTHESE 103, 
103 (1963) (Simplicity is not easy to define. But it may be expected, whatever it is, to be 
relative to the texture of a conceptual scheme.); Howard L. Rolston, A Note On Simplicity 
as a Principle for Evaluating Rival Scientific Theories, 43 PHIL. SCI. 438, 438 (1976) (dis-
cussing Quines argument that simplicity is relative to a conceptual schema). 
